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Combining Social Cohesion Theories
with Altered States of Consciousness
to Explain the Adaptive Advantages of
the Spiritual Capacity in Humans
"Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why?'
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand."
- Cat's Cradle by Kurt Vonnegut
Cognitive Developments within Homo
The Genus Homo is characterized by
the trait of self-awareness; a distinction that
separates it from its fellow animals because of
the development sometime within the evolving
Homo lineage of the capacity of individuals to
reflect on their own mortality and to contemplate
the existence of spiritual deities. These two
derived cognitive traits are observable across the
world in every present and past human culture
and may extend back into our Genus lineage. It
is important to understand the functional
adaptation of these two cerebral capabilities in
the context of what we already know about the
biological adaptations of modem Homo sapiens.
Modem humans have the capacity to reach
transcendental states of consciousness that seem
to whisk us away from the everyday world to a
spiritual dimension that is not governed by the
laws of physical matter. How and why did we
develop this faculty?
As one will witness in the following
discussion, after decades of proposed theories
about the evolution of a spiritual capacity within
Homo, there is still no consensus among
palaeoanthropologists. This paper will seek to
briefly outline the current theories, which will be
followed by a critique of the single-function
paradigm that is holding back scientists from
deciphering the anomaly of spirituality. I will
argue that there certainly is a socially cohesive
role for religion (as the communal form of
individual spirituality) that provided a
competitive advantage, but that this explanation
is not complete. The foundation of all human
spirituality was the initial "discovery" of altered
states of consciousness within our own minds
that first aided in solving those existential
dilemmas that are such a fundamental aspect of
the human condition.
The Beginnings of Spiritual Thought
The human condition is plagued by an
unpleasantness stemming from the dual
existential predicament where we (i) desperately
long for the impossibility of a tangible meaning
of life and are (ii) cognizant of our inevitable
death. No other living animal has to worry about
this and, when our ancestors were first
confronted with this anxiety, there must have
been an excruciating need for answers to their
newfound metaphysical questions. The source of
this uniquely human consideration is supposedly
our relatively large brain, which brought along
spatial comprehensions undocumented in earlier
Homo species. Apparently, our improved spatial
capabilities come from the use of our very
nimble hands in the manufacture of stone tools
(Wynn 1989). In the constant effort to produce
stone tools for the procurement and processing of
food, toolmakers would gradually learn the
physical laws involved in flint-knapping and
with practice and teaching, they were able to
produce more efficient results.
Generations of combined learning led to
two major breakthroughs in Homo spatial
competence that resulted in early Homo
(referring to all tool-making species preceding
Neanderthals and archaic Homo sapiens):
developing predetermined notions of a general
expected shape of a stone tool before the first
flake is whacked off, and the ability to consider a
whole (core) in relation to its parts (flakes).
These two breakthroughs allowed late Homo (for
the purposes of this paper referring to
Neanderthals, archaic and modem Homo
sapiens) to strategize the shape of their stone tool
beforehand, instead of merely whacking a core
randomly until a cutting surface appeared (Wynn
1989: 63-64). Yet it seems that these spatial
breakthroughs forced our ancestors to stumble
upon a new world of abstractions that brought
along existential baggage that had previously
been of no concern to earlier members of the
lineage. The split between late Homo and all
other conscious organisms is a spatial one, and it
is from this premise that one proceeds to
understand human spiritual capacity. In a way,
advances in the spatial competence of Homo
compelled the newly adapted species to think
about itself and its surroundings in the same
manner that they were conceptualizing the stone
tool. These new cognitive capabilities now
demanded that our species reflect upon itself in
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relation to external reality and to curiously
ponder this relationship. This new line of
thinking led to abstractions, where symbolic
culture arose for the fIrst time by connecting
objects or perceptions of the here-and-now with
conceptual notions, such as ideological systems
and future or past events:
We have the highest level of reactivity-
meaning that animals on this planet
have been able to achieve: what we call
symbolic behavior. Man himself coins
a designation for an object, and then
responds to that arbitrary designation.
The word "house," for example, has no
intrinsic qualities within itself that
would connect it with an object-we
could just as well use the words "casa "
or "maison," or "dom." So, unlike
Pavlov's dog, man creates the
relationship between stimuli. And
unlike the chimp reaching with a fIrm
pole for a banana, the airy symbol
"house" has nothing intrinsic in it that
would connect it with the object it
stands for (Becker 1971: 6-7).
The key to human spiritual capacity is found in
the unique abilities of symbolic
conceptualization and communication. Humans
must explain the world in which they exist
through associations so that everything from
physical objects to entire systems of metaphysics
must be given a particular symbolic structure,
according to which they are understood by
people who share a common culture. Sosis and
Alcorta exemplify this theory by looking at
rituals of marriage, which "link the abstraction of
future behaviors regarding sexual fidelity to the
community and are sanctified through emotional
associations" (Sosis & Alcorta 2003: 272).
Recent [mdings about the possibility for
a genetic coding of spirituality have found that
there is an apparent association between those
who have a C on their YMA T2 gene and have
high scores on a self-transcendence scale. Those
who have an A on YMA T2, however, score
lower on the scale. Dean Hamer and his team
were able to show that "somehow, this single-
base change was affecting every facet of self-
transcendence, from loving nature to loving God,
from feeling at one with the universe to being
willing to sacrifice for its improvement" (Hamer
2004: 73). Nevertheless, we are still not at the
functional root of the evolutionary problems of
religion and spirituality, for which there are a
plethora of theoretical proposItIons. The
following discussion will assess possible
exp~anations for the functional adaptation of a
spmtual capacity in humans, for which there are
tw.o.mai? approaches: one approach argues that
spmtuahty arose as a functional social
mechanism, while the other contends that it was
the derivative of a highly sophisticated brain
with a multifaceted consciousness and that
spiri~al ~oncepts developed' through
expenmentatlOn with altered states of
consciousness (ASC).
The Place of Homo sapiens within Homo
. . ..It is interesting to note the cognitive
slmllantIes between Homo sapiens and their
closest Homo relative, the Neanderthals. In an
evaluation of the Neanderthal mind, Thomas
Wynn and Frederick Coolidge (2004) claim that
the archaeological record indicates that
Neanderthals disappeared soon after the arrival
of modem Homo sapiens in Europe around
50,000 years ago. They proceed to argue that the
split between modem humans and Neanderthals
must be cognitive since:
Because working memory has
been empirically shown to be strongly
related to both general intelligence and
native, fluid intelligence, this mutation
might have subsequently had a
profound positive effect on the general
reasoning abilities of modem humans.
We have labeled this effect "enhanced
working memory" (EWM) ... Even if it
yielded only a slight selective
advantage, such a mutation could have
spread rapidly in African populations,
enabling the dramatic spread of
anatomically and behaviorally modem
humans after 50Ka (Wynn & Coolidge
2004: 469).
!he subtle split proposed by Wynn and Coolidge
IS that Neanderthals possessed an inferior
working memory, that it is the evolution of
enhanced working memory in humans that
allowed them to entertain more advanced
cognitive notions (including spiritual concepts),
and that this provided modems a competitive
edge over the Neanderthals.
The archaeological evidence appears to
suggest that Neanderthals could not ponder
metaphysical concepts and spirituality in the way
that modems could. It is assumed that
Neanderthals were the fIrst species of Homo to
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bury their dead and this could be taken as a sign
of a spiritual capacity, but it is also likely that
they were burying corpses merely to dispose of
the smell (Klein 1999: 469). The question, "Was
there a Neanderthal religion?" is answered in the
negative because arguments for shared
ideologies (e.g. the "Cave Bear cult"), ritual
cannibalism, and sacramental burials have all
been shown to be unfounded (Rowley-Conwy
1993: 70). Red and black ochre have been found
alongside Neanderthal burials, but it is believed
that these are residuals of clothing decoration
rather than a sign of ritual (Klein 1999: 441).
Wynn and Coolidge compare the meagerness of
Neanderthal burials to the extremely ornate
Homo sapiens burials in Sungir, Russia (32,000
B.P.) and Qafzeh, Israel (90,000-110,000 B.P.),
both of which include carefully selected beads
and ornaments found in association with the
bodies (Wynn & Coolidge 2004: 480). Such
contrast in grave goods suggests that the human
adaptation of EWM was sufficient to provide
Homo sapiens with a competitive advantage as
they moved into Europe. This advantage would
have made them more adaptively fit and this is
obvious when one considers that the human
species flourished while Neanderthals went
extinct.
An important point has been largely
ignored in discussions about the evolution of
religion (as the social institution of spirituality)
in that current religious groups have shown that
violence often results between groups that do not
share common religious views. The 20th Century
alone saw its share of religiously driven battles,
so why should we think of the original religious
groups as any different? "When group
membership and religious affiliation become
intertwined, group conflict easily escalates into
genocidal "holy wars" (Kurland 1999: 84). It is
not too far fetched a notion to argue that perhaps
the humans who were moving into the
Neanderthal territory in Europe brought with
them deeply ingrained religious convictions. In
this sense, the perverted depiction of Christopher
Stringer's Out of Africa model as "the dispersal
of 'killer Africans,' who wiped out other human
populations in a Pleistocene holocaust" (Stringer
1994: 150) may be a rational hypothesis after all.
Palaeoanthropologists must begin to entertain the
possibility that ancient humans probably
expressed tendencies for violent xenophobia just
like present day humans, and that their first
encounter with Neanderthals almost certainly
would not have been friendly and tolerant. The
EWM that humans developed would have given
them new cognitive abilities, which allowed
them to overcome whatever environment or
organism they came across and also provoked a
religious fervor that further encouraged an
aggressive nature.
Current Theories
The issue of the evolution of human
spirituality is very difficult to discuss within a
scientific framework. Indeed:
[w]ithin an evolutionary
perspective, one would primarily
explain the emergence of religions
along lines similar to the explanations
one would advance for social
contributions to the inclusive fitness of
the individuals or communities in which
they arose. Alternatively, one could
claim that religions arose as a side-
effect with the emergence of some other
trait. Perhaps with the rise of
consciousness questions about the
origin and meaning of the world and of
one's individual existence could arise,
and as long as other explanations were
not available, explanations in terms of
spirits and personal powers in and
beyond the world were attractive (Drees
1998: 323).
The difficult theoretical connection of
biological evolution and religious spirituality
was declared to be in "general stagnation" by
Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1966: I), but has since
become the focus of critical examination by
scholars, (such as Ernest Becker) who hope to
justify human spirituality within the confmes of
evolutionary theory. This has been no easy task,
yet it is important for the scientific community to
account for spirituality because it presents such a
pesky abnormality where rituals and religiously
driven labour seem evolutionarily uneconomical.
Hayden points out that "behaviour which
demands significant amounts of time and energy
but confers no adaptive advantage on a species,
not only has no reason to persist, but should be
actively selected against due to episodic
competition over resources" (Hayden 1987: 82).
Following this logic, any time and energy spent
on religious matters must provide spiritual
beings with a competitive advantage over their
neighbours. This is a common assumption about
the nature of adaptations, but as Stephen J. Gould
points out repeatedly, we often forget that
adaptations that increase fitness come in two
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different forms. Gould proposes the term
exaptation as a way of accounting for the other
half of the meaning of the concept of adaptation
that appears to be misunderstood by many
scholars:
A feature is an adaptation only
if it was built by natural selection for
the function it now performs.
[Exaptation] defmes adaptation in a
static, or immediate way as any feature
that enhances current fitness, regardless
of its historic origin. (As a further
confusion, adaptation refers both to a
process and a state of being. We are
only discussing state of being here-
that is, features contributing to fitness
(Gould 1982: 5).
In this way, exaptations are side-effects
of adaptation (as described in the Drees quote
above) that can now be discussed apart from the
more common restriction of adaptations as
simply those features that have a direct
functional correlate over a long period of
historical time.
The first set of hypotheses involves
those that argue for religious rituals and spiritual
activities as instruments that induce social
cohesion and solidarity. This can be witnessed
in modem religious groups, which helps to
suggest that rituals may have played a similar
role in the past. There are broader ecological
approaches that seek to rationalize religious
ritual in terms of mammalian communicative
routines, such as mating rituals and inborn
signaling between signaler and receiver (Sosis &
Alcorta 2003: 265). This is a likely candidate for
the distant origins of religious ritual, but fails to
clarify the question of how transcendental human
religiosity, in its plethora of forms, evolved from
involuntary mammalian behaviour. With the
advent of the genus Homo, there was the increase
in spatial competence discussed earlier, which
acted to distance the higher hominids from the
rest of the mammals. Considering this advance,
Social Solidarity theories arose, arguing that
ritual ceremonies, conducted for religious
purposes, acted to unify the group under a shared
belief system and to urge cohesion amongst the
individuals in the group (Sosis & Alcorta 2003:
265). This has been a very popular view because
it is more Homo-centered than the broad
ecological approaches and it describes the
complexity of human communication better than
analogies regarding less complex mammals.
Human communication is not a simple practice;
rather, the issues conveyed between humans are
often complex and indistinct. It has been
suggested that most human social
communication is the result of early religious
rituals, which allowed signals of yes-no, or more
ambiguous more-less, to be given and received
between clans. An example of this principle is
provided by the Maring peoples of New Guinea,
who indicate their intent to lend military support
to another clan by dancing in that clan's ritual
festivals (Rappaport 1971: 26). In this way,
Social Solidarity theorists argue that
participation in rituals allows for group selection
based on the success of the communication
bonds between groups who could then
reciprocate in aiding each other during droughts
or conflicts with other groups.
There is also the Ritual as Deception
theory, which claims that religious rituals arose
as a power struggle between individuals within
the group. Denouncing the group selection
assumptions, these theorists assert that natural
selection "should not favour organisms that
signal their honest intentions if greater gains can
be achieved through deception" (Sosis & Alcorta
2003: 266). The group can be exploited by
crafty individuals who promote and manipulate
religious ceremonies for their own gain.
Therefore, social cohesion is achieved by
individuals who convince the group that it is in
their best interest to participate in their deceptive
rituals built around a set of shared religious
beliefs.
On the other hand, Costly Signaling
theorists argue against deception by individuals
because religious systems originated as devices
of social cohesion by creating signals of
dedication that were costly to fake. In order to
be accepted as part of a social group with shared
religious ideology, one had to participate
willingly in rituals that would otherwise deter
non-believers from going to great lengths of
deception in order to swindle their peers. In this
way, "trust is enhanced among group members,
which enables them to minimize costly
monitoring mechanisms that are otherwise
necessary to overcome the free-rider problems
that typically plague collective pursuits" (Sosis
& Alcorta 2003: 267). These three theories of
the evolution of religion are promising in that
they are able to link what seems to be the
inefficiency of religious rituals with possible
benefits of ritual as providing competitive
advantage against groups that are not held
together by shared religious ideology. Others
have argued, however, that social cohesion is
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only a byproduct of adapted spiritual capabilities
that were merely side effects of cognitive
adaptations unrelated to social benefits.
Theories aimed at explaining spirituality
and religious beliefs as the byproduct of previous
adaptations are more focused on the evolution of
the human mind. Of course the mind is
intimately connected to the physical brain
structure, but there is also attention being paid to
the more elusive adaptive features of human
consciousness. To a certain degree, the origin of
these sets of hypotheses can be attributed to the
early 20th century psychological explanations of
the evolution of religion that are now snubbed by
many archaeologists. Those opposed to this
cognitive view of the evolution of spiritual
abilities argue that there is no evolutionary
purpose for metaphysical anxieties to exist
because there is no competitive advantage for
anxieties to have adapted in the first place
(Hayden 1987: 83). This is a narrow-minded
approach to the process of evolution since there
is the possibility that beneficial traits evolve as
adaptations to certain environmental conditions,
while at the same time the new trait can bring
along adaptational baggage. A perfect example
of this is the increase in cognitive abilities in late
Homo, which conferred upon these hominids a
competitive advantage in problem solving and
tool technology while at the same time forcing
them to entertain metaphysical concepts that had
previously been psychologically unattainable.
The first of these cognitive approaches is Ritual
Healing theory, which focuses on the uniqueness
of human religious systems (including ritual, arts
and language) as the only animal behaviour that
associates physical responses in the automatic
nervous system with abstract notions. The
theory holds that shamanism was the original
form of religious practice and that its focus on
healing and ASC are indicative of the earliest
religious priorities (Sosis & Alcorta 2003 :270-
271). A current study of the function of the
human pineal gland is one case of the new
research on the relationship between ASC and
health, which has produced some surprising
results. Researchers have found that those who
frequently experience sexual pleasure and
spiritual transcendence have pineal glands that
release chemicals into the body that suppress
cancer growth and increase overall health. On
the other hand, people who are spiritually
anxious and sexually repressed are found to have
greater tumor growth and overall
immunosuppression (Lissoni et al. 2001). This
fits well into James McClenon's (1997) model of
the evolution of religion through the use of ritual
as a healing sacrament to induce therapeutic
altered states of consciousness. He argues that
those who naturally fell into ASC stayed
healthier and passed on their genotypes to
following generations, while those that did not
have the genetic basis for religiosity were more
susceptible to disease (McClenon 1997). These
ideas are interesting, as they imply that the more
spiritual a person is, the better their chances of
survival.
Researchers who ascribe to the social-
cohesion school of thought have trouble
accepting that spirituality may not have an
evolutionary function by itself, but the argument
for religion as an evolutionary byproduct is very
convincing nonetheless. Kirkpatrick (1999)
outlines the grounds upon which it can be
hypothesized that spirituality was not an
adaptation in itself, but was instead the offshoot
of adaptations that arose for other purposes.
First, it has been the tendency of past scholars to
assume that spiritual feelings must have a direct
adaptive rationale. Second, past studies have
been too focused on trying in vain to fmd a
universal characteristic of all religions when, in
reality, the tremendous diversity that exists
between religions suggests that there is not one
lone adaptive function. Third, religious
behaviour is an evolutionary byproduct much
like other behaviors such as playing sports,
driving cars or doing mathematics, none of
which has an apparent functional evolutionary
correlate (Kirkpatrick 1999: 926). It is clear that
the mystery of the evolution of the human
spiritual capacity must be reframed in order to
account for these discrepancies, and it appears
that the only path to enlightenment on the issue
is through the exploration of altered states of
consciousness. ASC may offer a window into
how our ancestors experimented with their own
minds in an effort to attain communal spiritual
ecstasy.
The "Stoned Ape" Hypothesis
Perhaps the most intriguing avenue of
new research into the competitive advantage
provided by a communal spirituality (religion) is
offered by Terence McKenna's Stoned Ape
hypothesis. McKenna maintains that
entheogens, "plants or chemical substances
which awaken or generate mystical experiences"
(Forte 1997: 1), are the so-called "missing link"
that scholars have been searching for (McKenna
1992: 32). Through observing some of the most
ancient iconographic depictions of religious
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ritual relative to the known effects of psilocybin
mushrooms and grasses containing
Dimethyltryptamine (DMT), McKenna (1992)
proposes that the fIrst religious members of the
genus Homo were African tribes who began to
experiment with entheogenic mushrooms and
grasses that they found growing in the emerging
grassland habitat. At fIrst glance, this theory
seems to be describing a Lamarckian view of
evolution. McKenna defends his theory,
however, by citing that the use of mushrooms
was the fIrst "discovery" of otherworldly realms
within our newly developed Homo sapiens
consciousness (Wynn would say Enhanced
Working Memory), and that this led to the fIrst
groups exploiting the competitive advantage of
religious ritual:
The presence of psilocybin in the
hominid diet changed the parameters of
the process of natural selection by
changing the behavioral patterns upon
which that selection was operating.
Experimentation with many types of
foods was causing a general increase in
the numbers of random mutations being
offered up to the process of natural
selection, while the augmentation of
visual acuity, language use, and ritual
activity through the use of psilocybin
represented new behaviors ... Hence
psilocybin inclusion in the diet shifted
the parameters of human behaviour in
favour of patterns of activity that
promoted increased language;
acquisition of language led to more
vocabulary and an expanded memory
capacity. The psilocybin-using
individuals evolved epigenetic rules or
cultural forms that enabled them to
survive and reproduce better than other
individuals. Eventually the more
successful epigenetic ally based styles of
behaviour spread through the
populations along with the genes that
reinforce them. In this fashion the
population would evolve genetically
and culturally (McKenna 1992: 27-28).
This explanation fIts nicely with the
fmding of Dean Hamer's (2004) "God Gene" in
that the new social framework created by the use
of these entheogens would have created a
selective process where those who lacked the
proper genetic code for heightened spirituality
were selected against.
McKenna clearly ascribes to the Out of
Africa theory of evolution rather than the
Multiregional hypothesis because he assumes
that religion originated in Africa along with the
fIrst Homo sapiens (McKenna 1992: 34).
Nevertheless, his line of reasoning is very
persuasive as he points to the cave paintings of
the Tassili-n-Ajjer Plateau of Algeria. This
region boasts a series of cave paintings (12,000
B.C.) that portray fIgures of shamans holding
mushrooms, garbed in mushroom shaped
swellings and "surrounded by the geometric
structures of their hallucinations" (McKenna
1992: 70). It is clear that the culture living in
Tassili-n-Ajjer was ingesting these mushrooms
and translating their experiences as important
encounters with the divine. It is very hard for
contemporary minds to accept this notion of
drug-use because these substances are relegated
to an objectionable status within modem Western
society. However, modem biases are no reason
to ignore suggestible evidence and perhaps if
palaeoanthropologists begin to understand the
effects of these substances, there can be
improved understanding of how the fust spiritual
concepts were formed. McKenna's "Stoned
Ape" hypothesis is simply one example of
thinking outside the box in an attempt to uncover
hidden secrets about the evolution of human
religious behaviour and belief. It may be
absolutely wrong, but this theory's pursuit of a
solution is an attempt to further the discipline by
questioning past approaches and offering up
fresh ideas to be tested against the archaeological
record.
Conclusions
It is evident that there is little consensus
concerning the explanation for the evolution of a
spiritual capacity in Homo sapiens. Yet the two
competing viewpoints are mutually helpful
because there is probably some truth in both the
social cohesion theories and the cognitive
approaches. In the end, an explanation for the
evolutionary function of religion and spirituality
will most likely include the essence of both
paradigms given that ritual behaviour and
communal ideologies seem to offer both social
unity and metaphysical wellness. The
evolutionary justifIcation of spirituality may not
correspond to the functions of other derived traits
of Homo sapiens, but this should not deter
researchers from pursuing other possibilities.
The sciences have continually been forced to
rethink long-established doctrines because of
their limitations and our current analysis may
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warrant a need for another paradigm shift. This
is especially true when we consider how the
connection between spiritual transcendence and
the cognitive system has been overlooked by
those seeking a direct functional link where one
may not even exist. We must begin to think of
spirituality as we think of playing hockey or
riding a bike, in that these activities are not
adaptations in themselves, but rather, they are
exaptations; side-effects of functional
adaptations that just so happen to give us the
ability to accomplish unrelated feats. Our ability
to play sports or control vehicles is the result of
our experimental nature, which urges us to
explore our natural abilities to fmd out what we
are capable of. Theories like the "stoned ape"
hypothesis highlight this fact by arguing that our
ancestors probably applied their experimental
disposition to their internal worlds as well, by
exploring altered states of consciousness and the
extreme limits of their minds. Future research
should delve into this possibility in an attempt to
better comprehend the likely conduct of the
original spiritual beings.
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